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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN W. CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 
11847 
LELIS AUTOMATIC 
TRANSMISSION SERVICE, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Emmett Brown, District Judge 
Joseph J. Palmer of 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Seventh Floor 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys 'f:Rrtt E D 
r nA'( q c: -.,:,-;: l 
Ill ,:., 0 I,. I '· 
J. Lambert Gibson 
174 East 8th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for . Appellant -
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 








RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Respondent petitions the Court for rehearing of this 
matter upon the grounds that the newly raised theories 
relied upon in the Conrt's opinion of April 3, 1970, are 
harred by limitations, and upon the three grounds stated 
in the dissenting opinion lie rein. 
FACTS 
Refen1nce is made to the statement of facts in re-
'ti0ndent's original brief herein. Additionally, according 
to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff in reliance 
npon defendant's advertising, had his vehicle repaired 
by defendant in February, 1966. At that point in time 
2 
plaintiff k1ww Pxactly what the tPrms of deft'ur]a,/ 
written guarnntee Wl're and ho,,· tlwy differ"d I'---· . 
• ' lUlll 
understanding of the ne1Ys1· m]H'l' adn•rtisiJ10· •u1-11 ,. ' - - . , h L\ fl' 
tlwn krn•w that he had heen cluu-ged for to\ring· conti:ii 
to tlw frpe towing lit> C'X]Wct<'d from tlw · 
'l'his action was not COllllllt'nced until .Jnl)· 1:11;' 
a period of morP than thn•e yt>ars. 
ANY CLAIJ\I OTHER THAN ONE BASED ON CO\'. 
TRACT IS BARRED BY LIMITATIONS. 
Plaintiff pleadPd and r<'liPd npon thP claim of hm 1 
of contract, both in the District Conrt and on 
These clainrn wonld be goYerned hy the four or 
periods of limitation applicahlc· to oral or written 1" 
tracts and lwncP not harrc·d, but tlw t·' 
plaint fails to state a claim for breach of contract 11' 
the reasons raised in respondent's hrid. 
Although not nwntioned or raised at any point Iii 
record or argument, the majority opinion rai,ed <1 :· 
non-contract theory, stating: 
"Plaintiff has alleged certain 1' 
dnct on the part of the defendant rl 1c1f"' 
or 111islcadi11g ad1;crtisiw1), which has proxini:i" 
3 
caused lw. rm to plaintiff, and the nature and 
amount of the damagPs snstaim•d." (Emplia<;is 
supplied.) 
Thf' Conrt the11 qnoh'::> 7G-4--1, P.C.A. Hl53, a crimi-
0tatnt(' for fraudulent a<kertising and holds that a 
1inlation of tlw statut0 ma>- give rise to ciYil liahilit>-· 
Any claim not limwd upon an oral or 1vritten contract 
the fads plPaded would he barred b>r the limitations 
Jllf',(ribed 78-12-2G (2), (3) or (4), U.C.A. 1953. If 
:lw action is YiewPd as one of fraud, then the cause of 
;1f'tiu11 arose when tlw plaintiff discovered the facts consti-
tnting tlw framl. That would be when plaintiff found 
defendant's adwrtising to he false, in February, 1966, 
ac1·onling to the complaint, more' than three years before 
the of the action. If the action is viewed 
a> one based on liability created by the statutes of the 
'tale, that is upon 7G-4-1, or as an action for injury 
to personal J1ro1wrty, then the action is similarly barred 
!11 !lie 1hr(•p .war lapse. 
\Yhil1· limitation::; is ordinarily a matter of defense, 
11 lwn !lie lapse aJJpears on tlw of the complaint, it 
111· raisPd by 111otion to dismiss the complaint. Rules 
'Ir·) and D(f) U.H.C.P. Layton vs. Union Pacific Railroad 
110
• (19C8) Utah 2d 374, 445 P.2d 988; Johanson vs. 
('url"li.IJ P11d:ing, (1944) 107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98; 
Pu!/erf011 r.1'. Baile!J, (1898) 17 Utah 85, 53 Pac. 1020; 
J,,,1,. I. 
· • 100 11 1 s. ,111to11, (7th Cir., 1949) 178 F2d. 304, 309. 
4 
'rhe llllJlead0d theory lwre is particularly snhjre.t \ritj,, . 
bar of limitations, even though raised on motion a1 IL: , 
Any claim hasecl upon contract, while not han1d \,. 
limitat;ons, ,,·ould liaYP to lH• based upon tlw \nitten \ii1i 
ranty subscribed by plaintiff and plaintiff lrn:s 
to state a claim for breach of the writtl'n contract, asl11[, 
by the trial court, for the n·asons indicated in respullll 
ent's original hrief. Plaintiff signed the \\Titfrn warrn111 
and it said ''there are no guarantees and wanantic,, 1i i 
lJTessed or irnpl i\c•d except this guarantee aml warrant: i 
(R. 9). In R('d111011d v.s. Petty Motor Co., (1952) 121 
370, 242 P.2d 302, and in Landes and ComJHfll!J l'. Fu 
lows, 81 Utah 432, 19 P.2d 389, it was ht>ld that \rher1,1l1 
written contract proYided ther<e> was no other \\'ana;1r .. 
express or implied, the plaintiff could not i111uli: 
oral ·warranty gi yen before the Pxecution of the coutn 11 ! 
or an implied warranty of fibwss. So here plaintiff ti111 
not rely upon the prior advertising or oral statPrn1·11 
to claim breach of ·warranty. 
CONCLUSION 
This is not a typical petition for rehearing. Ti 
court's opinion was based on an entirely new theory JW\'' 
before submitted or argued b;.· counsel, and it npJ'1':ir· 
from the face of the complaint that the theory j,; han:' 
by limitations. Rehearing should also be granted for 111 ' 
5 
''"a ill t11e dis!·wnting opinion herein. Under 
t!ii·'I' ('xtraordinar_\' rirenrnstancPs it is submitted the 
:·rr11rt grant n•l1Paring. 
Ht>spedfnlly submitted, 
\VORSLKY, 8.N"OW & CHRIS'l'ENSEN 
BY .JOSEPH .J. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
